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ORIGINAL MEANING AND  
THE DEATH PENALTY 
 
BY JOHN STINNEFORD1 
Thank you so much for having me here today and thank you, Ms. Bishop, 
for that talk; that was really wonderful and inspiring.2 I started my career as 
a visiting professor here at St. Thomas. Those were two of the best years of 
my life. It is not an overstatement to say that your faculty here taught me 
how to be a teacher and a scholar, and a person of faith as well, in many 
ways. It is a wonderful homecoming to be back here. 
 
I would also like to share my own personal convictions before I move on to 
constitutional law, which is what I am going to talk about today. I am 
personally against the death penalty. I think it is a profound tragedy that it 
still exists, particularly because of the risk of executing the innocent. There 
is no way to eliminate this risk. I was a federal prosecutor myself for a 
while and at one point I discovered that we had charged an innocent person 
in a bank robbery case. Federal prosecutors have relatively small caseloads 
compared to state’s attorneys, and lots of resources, and yet the only reason 
we found out before conviction that this person was innocent was pure 
accident – pure luck. If that is happening in the federal system, it is 
certainly happening in all the state systems. I do not think there is any way 
to eradicate it.  
 
But I am going to talk today about a different question: Whether the death 
penalty is constitutional. The main thing that I write about, and think about, 
is the original meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.3 
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Today, I am going to look at the constitutionality of the death penalty from 
the perspective of original meaning. I do not think the death penalty itself is 
cruel and unusual within the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment, 
although certain applications of it certainly are.4 If the court paid closer 
attention to the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment, we would 
probably limit much of what we do. 
 
Let me start by talking a little about what has happened in recent years – 
really since the early 2000s – with respect to the death penalty. In some 
ways, the Court has reached out to limit the scope of the death penalty. In 
recent decades, it has declared the death penalty to be cruel and unusual for 
mentally disabled offenders,5 for juvenile offenders,6 and for anyone 
convicted of a non-homicide offense against an individual.7 At the same 
time, the Court has twice upheld the constitutionality of lethal injection as a 
manner of execution.8 I am going argue today that some of the Court’s 
decisions limiting the death penalty may (or may not) be defensible from 
the perspective of original meaning. The decisions upholding lethal 
injection, on the other hand, are probably incorrect. Lethal injection is 
probably an unconstitutional method of punishment. The reasons it is 
unconstitutional shed a lot of light on what is wrong with our criminal 
justice system generally, so I will be talking about that in a little while. 
 
Let me start by noting the difficulty of the problem that any court faces in 
deciding whether a punishment is cruel and unusual. The very purpose of 
punishment is to inflict pain. We are inflicting physical pain and 
psychological pain in retaliation for wrongdoing; that is what punishment 
is.  
 
To decide that something is cruel and unusual, you have to figure out what 
the line is between constitutionally acceptable pain and unconstitutionally 
cruel pain. How do we draw that line? It is an extraordinarily difficult line 
to draw once you think about it as a legal matter. The court has adopted two 
diametrically opposite ways of trying to answer this problem. When Justice 
Scalia was alive, he represented an “originalist” perspective. He basically 
said, “If a punishment was okay in 1790, it must be okay today; that is how 
                                                          
John F. Stinneford, Death, Desuetude, and Original Meaning, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 531 
(2014); John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of "Cruel", 105 GEO. L.J. 441 (2017). 
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5 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
6 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).  
7 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008). 
8 See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008); Glossip v. Gross, 135 S.Ct. 2726 (2015).  
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we figure out whether something is cruel and unusual.”9 Simply look at 
what they did in 1790, and if they did it then, they can do it today. He also 
took the position that there is no proportionality principle under the Eighth 
Amendment.10 That is to say, if a method of punishment was used for any 
crime in 1790, it can be used for an entirely different crime today. For 
example, if life imprisonment was available for murder in 1790, then we 
can use it today for shoplifting. He argued that courts should not ask 
whether a punishment is disproportionate to a given crime, but only 
whether the punishment is inherently cruel or barbaric.  
 
The majority, on the other hand, has taken an explicitly non-originalist 
approach to the problem. They suggest the Eighth Amendment must draw 
its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that marked the 
progress of a maturing society.11 The idea here is that every day and in 
every way society is getting kinder and gentler, and as society gets kinder 
and gentler, so too does the Eighth Amendment. We are not bound to the 
standards of 1790; we are bound instead to the standards of today.12  
 
Now, notice that Justice Scalia’s “originalist” standard and the majority’s 
non-originalist standard are mirror images of each other, because each asks 
the Court to take a snapshot of public opinion at a given moment in time.13 
Justice Scalia says the Court should take a snapshot of 1790; the majority 
says the Court should take a snapshot of today. I am going to argue that 
both of these methods of interpreting the Eighth Amendment are incorrect 
as a matter of original meaning. In fact, the second one does not even 
pretend to be correct.14 They are also unworkable. They do not really work 
in practice, and that is one of the reasons why the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause is so very weak today as a protection for criminal 
offenders.15 
 
What are the problems with each of these approaches? The problem with 
Justice Scalia's standard is that in 1790, punishments such as whipping, 
bodily mutilation, and the pillory were considered acceptable forms of 
punishment. Justice Scalia himself, shortly after he got on the Supreme 
Court, gave a famous talk at the University of Cincinnati law school, where 
he called himself a “faint-hearted originalist.”16 He said:  
                                                          
9 John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to 
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11 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
12 Id.  
13 Stinneford, supra note 8, at 1743.  
14 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  
15 Id. 
16 See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862, 864 (1989). 





What if some state should enact a new law providing public 
lashing, or branding of the right hand, as punishment for certain 
criminal offenses? Even if it could be demonstrated unequivocally 
that these were not cruel and unusual measures in 1791, and even 
though no prior Supreme Court decision has specifically 
disapproved them, I doubt whether any federal judge-even among 
the many who consider themselves originalists-would sustain them 
against an [E]ighth [A]mendment challenge…I hasten to confess 
that in a crunch I may prove a faint-hearted originalist. I cannot 
imagine myself, any more than any other federal judge, upholding a 
statute that imposes the punishment of flogging.17  
Now, later in his career, he became less faint-hearted. He said,  
 
“[W]hat I would say now is, yes, if a state enacted a law permitting 
flogging, it is immensely stupid, but it is not unconstitutional.”18 Despite 
Justice Scalia’s change of heart later in life, the fact that he himself would 
have trouble upholding his own standard in practice indicates that it may 
not be a very workable standard, may not be a very good standard. 
 
What is the problem with the evolving standard of decency test? There are 
all sorts of problems with it. I am going to walk through some of them now. 
The first is the “Who decides?” problem. How do we figure out what 
current standards of decency are? Should the Court look to juries and 
legislatures? This might make sense because the jury is a cross section of 
the people, and the legislature is elected to represent the people. The Court 
has never limited itself to those two sources of information, however. 
Sometimes it looks to international opinion, sometimes to the opinions of 
professional associations, and sometimes to public opinion polls.19 Justices 
Brennan and Marshall famously looked to hypothetical public opinion – 
what would the public think if they only knew as much as we Supreme 
Court justices know?20 So, it is hard to say what our sources of information 
about current standards of decency are. This is a particular problem, if you 
think about it, because anytime a death penalty case gets up to the Supreme 
Court, the punishment has been authorized by at least one legislature and 
imposed by at least one jury. Often, it has been authorized by many 
legislators and imposed by many juries. 
 
                                                          
17 Id. at 861. 
18 See Marcia Coyle, The Roberts Court: The Struggle for the Constitution 165 (1st ed. 2013); 
Jennifer Senior, In Conversation: Justice Scalia, N.Y. MAG., Oct. 14, 2013, at 24. 
19 Stinneford, supra note 8, at 1751.  
20 Id. 
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So, if the court were serious about relying on current societal attitudes, it 
would almost never strike down the death penalty or any other punishment, 
because the punishment has been authorized by the people and that is what 
the test is supposed to measure. 
 
A second problem with this standard is that it ties in the meaning of the 
Eighth Amendment to current public opinion. Public opinion and individual 
rights are not like chocolate and peanut butter; they are not two great tastes 
that taste great together.21 They are more like oil and water; they should 
never mix. The reason we have a bill of rights is to protect unpopular 
people from public opinion when public opinion turns against them. It is 
hard to imagine a more unpopular group of people than criminal offenders, 
especially in death penalty cases.  
 
The notion that the Eighth Amendment only protects criminal offenders 
when public opinion supports such protection is a perverse idea, and again, 
it is based on a very naïve and incorrect view of public opinion. As I said 
earlier, the evolving standards of decency test is based on the assumption 
that we are actually getting kinder and gentler over time as a society. That 
is not necessarily true. Sometimes we get kinder and gentler, but sometimes 
we get much harsher. In fact, anyone who has lived in the last forty years 
knows that we have had a series of public panics about crime in this 
country. In the 60s and 70s, it was crime rates generally. In the 80s, it was 
drug crime. In the 90s, it was juvenile super-predators. Today, it is sex 
offenders. Every time there is a public panic about a group of offenders, 
what do the legislatures do? They ratchet up the harshness of punishment to 
new and unprecedented levels.  
 
Now, if the Court were to take the evolving standards of decency test 
seriously, the Court would have to approve all of the new cruelty – all the 
new harshness – because it is strongly supported by public opinion. It is a 
very problematic standard from that perspective, right? It is important to 
think about this when we think of ourselves as being so much better, and 
more advanced, than people were at the end of the 18th century, for 
example, because we do not use the pillory and that sort of thing. 
 
But look at where we are. In 1970, there were 300,000 incarcerated people 
in this country, and today there are 2.25 million.22 Now if you look at just 
population growth, you would expect that 300,000 to become maybe 
600,000 by today. Instead, we have 2.25 million. We incarcerate more 
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people in this country than any other country in the history of the world, so 
are we kinder and gentler? I think that is open to question. 
 
The result of the Court’s adoption of the evolving standards of decency test 
has been an Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that is both narrow and 
unprincipled.23 It is unprincipled especially in its treatment of the death 
penalty. That is to say, the Court has reached out to limit the death penalty 
in a number of areas, but it had to do so by pretending to find a consensus 
against the punishment when no such consensus exists. For example, let's 
take the death penalty for non-homicide offenders. The case of Kennedy v. 
Louisiana was a case involving aggravated rape of a child, and the courts 
said you could not execute someone for aggravated rape of a child, despite 
the fact that there was a strong legislative trend towards authorizing this 
punishment.24  
 
Take a public opinion poll on that one. How many people do you think 
would be against the death penalty for those who commit aggravated rape 
against young children? I doubt you would find a majority of people against 
that punishment. So, the Court had to simply pretend that there is a 
consensus, and it did so in other death penalty cases as well. It is bad for the 
Court, bad for the Constitution, and bad for the rule of law when the Court 
pretends to find a societal consensus that does not really exist so that the 
Court can reach a result that it wants to reach.  
 
On the other hand, with respect to sentences of imprisonment, the Court has 
basically taken an almost completely hands-off approach. It has done some 
things to protect juvenile offenders from life sentences without the 
possibility of parole,25 but beyond that it has taken an almost completely 
hands-off approach. At the very moment prison sentences have become 
harsher than they ever were before, the Court said, “Do what you like, 
legislature; we are going to defer to you.”26 Now, why did they do that? 
Because again, the evolving standards of decency test would not really 
help. 
 
The Court cannot simply pretend to find a societal consensus against a 
punishment in cases involving large numbers of offenders, because if the 
Court’s decision resulted in large numbers of offenders being released, 
based on a blatantly made up Supreme Court finding, there would be a lot 
of political blowback against the Court. So, the Court simply leaves prison 
alone. 
                                                          
23 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  
24 See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008).  
25 See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).  
26 See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991). 
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The death penalty is very important, but you need to understand that even at 
its height in modern times it was very, very rarely imposed, so the Court's 
death penalty decisions have protected maybe one one-thousandth of one 
percent of all felony offenders in this country. The other millions who come 
through the criminal justice system every year are completely unprotected. 
The evolving standards of decency test, in addition to being incorrect from 
an originalist perspective, simply does not work very well. 
 
You might be thinking, “Well, what do we do Stinneford? It is easy to be a 
critic, right? You said that it is a hard problem. What is the solution?” I am 
glad you are all sitting down because it is a shocking one. The solution is to 
actually read the Constitution before you try to enforce it. 
 
Particularly, take notice of the fact that the Eighth Amendment does not 
prohibit cruel punishments, but cruel and unusual punishments and both 
sides have ignored the word unusual in this debate.27 The plurality opinion 
in Trop v. Dulles, the case that announced evolving standards of decency 
test, said: 
 
Whether the word “unusual” has any qualitative meaning different 
from “cruel” is not clear. On the few occasions this Court has had 
to consider the meaning of the phrase, precise distinctions between 
cruelty and unusualness do not seem to have been drawn… These 
cases indicate that the Court simply examines the particular 
punishment involved in light of the basic prohibition against 
inhuman treatment, without regard to any subtleties of meaning that 
might be latent in the word “unusual.”…If the word “unusual” is to 
have any meaning apart from the word “cruel,” however, the 
meaning should be the ordinary one, signifying something different 
from that which is generally done.”28  
 
Interestingly, Justice Scalia in Harmelin vs. Michigan – his big originalist 
opinion – did the same thing.29 He asserted that it is unclear what unusual 
means, and that if it means anything, it means “[s]uch as is [not] in common 
use.”30 Both the originalists and the non-originalists largely ignored the 
meaning of the word. This makes sense in a way, because who cares how 
unusual a punishment is? It would seem that the more often you do 
something cruel, the worse it is. It may be cruel to torture only the worst 
sex offenders on only rare occasions. But if we were torturing every 
                                                          
27 Stinneford, supra note 8, at 1824 (citing Ewing, 538 U.S. at 25). 
28 Trop, 356 U.S. at 100 n.32. 
29 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991). 
30 Id. at 976. 




shoplifter who came through the door, that seems to be a much worse thing 
to do. 
 
So, why should we care about whether a punishment is “unusual” or not? 
We should care because the word does not mean what we have all thought 
it means. The word “unusual” in the Eighth Amendment does not mean rare 
or uncommon; it actually means contrary to long usage.31 In other words, it 
means new or innovative. When you hear “cruel and unusual,” think “cruel 
and new.” The word “unusual” is a common-law term that reflects the 
common law ideology underlying the Eighth Amendment and much of the 
Bill of Rights.32 I need to unpack this for a little bit. So, the students 
probably did not think you were going to get cold called, but let me cold 
call you. Tell me, what is the common law? What you were taught in law 
school that common law is? Judge-made law right? That is what I was 
taught in law school. That is what most people are taught today in all their 
first-year courses: judge-made law. Judges make the common law. This is 
an idea that we got largely from Oliver Wendell Holmes, who announced 
that the common law is simply judges making public policy from the bench 
based on their idea of what is good public policy.33 But this is a lie. That is 
not what the common law was thought to be prior to Holmes. Critics of the 
common law claimed that judges really made law, but they made this claim 
in order to delegitimize the common law, because judges do not have the 
authority to make law. Contrary to the critics, common law thinkers said 
that the common law was a kind of customary law – the law of custom and 
long usage. Not judge-made law. So, the justification for the common law 
was never that the judges have the power to make the law.  
 
Here is the idea behind the common law: for common law thinkers, there 
was the common law. It was out there, judges were using it, and they 
started thinking, “Well, how could the common law be law, because the 
king has never said, ‘Thou shalt or thou shalt not’?” Parliament has never 
said, “Thou shalt and thou shalt not.” Yet somehow it is still law, because 
the judges were applying customary rules in these cases. The idea behind 
the common law became that, when a legal practice is used for a very long 
time throughout the jurisdiction, this is evidence that it is reasonable and 
that it enjoys the stable multi-generational consent of the people. If it did 
not enjoy that, it would stop being used. So, the idea was that it was okay to 
have customary law and to enforce it in court, because long usage 
guarantees that it is reasonable and just and it enjoys the consent of the 
                                                          
31 See Stinneford, supra note 8. 
32 Id. at 1745. 
33 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law, Project Gutenberg at 35, 36 (2013), 
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/2449/2449-h/2449-h.htm. 
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people. That is the idea behind the common law – customary law supported 
by long usage. 
 
Now over time this developed into an idea that the common law was 
normatively superior to enacted law – that is, morally superior to enacted 
law. It tracks more closely to fundamental principles of justice because it 
does not become law until long usage has shown it to be good, whereas 
enacted law does not have the same guarantee of goodness. I think anyone 
who has any familiarity with laws passed by a legislature knows this to be 
true. There was that famous moment during the Obamacare debate when 
Nancy Pelosi said, “We have to pass the law before we can tell what is in 
it,” and everyone kind of laughed and mocked her about it, but in a way this 
is true of every law.34 Even if you know what is in a law, once it gets passed 
and starts getting used, it often has unintended effects that are unjust or 
inconvenient. 
 
Common law thinkers said that the common law is normatively superior to 
enacted law because long usage guarantees that its effects will be just and 
reasonable, whereas enacted laws enjoy no such guarantee. Now this is 
important because it developed into a further idea, which is the very idea of 
rights enforceable against the sovereign.35 This is where the very idea of 
individual rights came from in the Anglo American system, because the 
notion was, since the common law is much more just and reliable than laws 
enacted by Parliament, the common law places some limits on what king or 
Parliament can do.36 If they do something that undermines a fundamental 
right established by the common law, then this is not real law.37 This is 
beyond their true authority. This is a mere active power and not law.38 
 
That is the idea behind individual rights: they come from the common law. 
Though this idea came from England, it never fully succeeded in England. 
England actually underwent a civil war between the King and Parliament 
that concerned, at least in part, whether the power of the sovereign could be 
constrained by the common law.39 England ultimately settled on the 
absolute sovereignty of Parliament, which could not be constrained by the 
common law. But in America, the idea of common law limits on sovereign 
power caught on and held. The American Revolution itself was based on 
                                                          
34 See Dan MacGuill, Did Nancy Pelosi Say Obamacare Must be Passed to ‘Find Out What Is in 
It’?, Snopes (Oct. 2017), https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/pelosi-healthcare-pass-the-bill-to-
see-what-is-in-it/. 
35 Stinneford, supra note 8, at 1771-72. 
36 Id.  
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Jane J. Ohlmeyer, English Civil Wars, Encyclopædia Brittanica (Nov. 2018), 
https://www.britannica.com/event/English-Civil-Wars. 




this idea. When the sovereign tried to tax us without giving us 
representation in Parliament, tried to take away the right to a jury trial, et 
cetera, the refrain was, “You can't do that, because you are violating rights 
established through long usage, established through common law.” 
 
So, the idea now – I hope you are getting the idea here – is that this is our 
baseline for understanding whether a given governmental action is just or 
unjust. Does it violate rights established through long usage? You may say, 
“That is great about the common law, but how do we know that the word 
‘unusual’ means contrary to long usage?” I said “unusual” is something that 
violates rights established through long usage. But how do we know that is 
what the term means? 
 
We know what “unusual” means largely because of a man named Titus 
Oates. Now in 2005, Oates was voted the worst Briton of the seventeenth 
century and the third-worst Briton of the past thousand years.40 He is a bad 
guy, but he is actually one of my favorite people, because he helps us 
understand what cruel and unusual means. Let me tell you the story of Titus 
Oates. 
 
Oates was a disreputable seventeenth century Anglican clergyman.41 He 
had fallen on hard times, he had had trouble with the law, and he started 
thinking, “How can I get fame and fortune?” He was sort of a Kardashian 
of his era. He wanted fame and fortune and he thought, “Well, people do 
not like Catholics very much. Everyone is always worried that the Spanish 
Armada is going to come sailing up the Thames. If I make up a story about 
a Popish plot to kill the king and I name the conspirators, everyone will 
love me because I have saved the monarchy, and I will have fame and 
fortune!” So, he does that. He makes up a story about a Popish plot to kill 
the king.42 He goes to a magistrate in London and gives evidence about this 
plot.43 Ten days later, the magistrate turns up dead in the streets of 
London.44 So, it is a panic now. Everyone is panicked – the Catholics are 
coming, the Catholics are coming.45 They have a series of trials of all the 
conspirators that Oates named: trial, conviction, execution; trial, conviction, 
execution. One after the other until we get to the final trial, at which point 
Oates’ story falls apart.46 Oates had claimed to witness a key meeting of the 
                                                          
40 ‘Worst’ historical Britons list, BBC News, (Dec. 2005), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk/4561624.stm. 
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conspirators in England on a certain date. It turns out that Oates was 
actually in France – you know, drinking some wine and eating cheese – on 
that day and that the whole story had been made up.47 It all fell apart.48 
 
Now the question was, “What do we do with Titus Oates?” If you think 
about Titus Oates, he is like a serial killer, right?49 But he is worse than a 
typical serial killer, because the typical serial killer has some kind of 
psychological compulsion.50 But Oates just wanted fame and fortune, and 
he was willing to kill innocent people to get it. So, what do we do with 
Oates? The problem was that, as a legal matter, the only crime he had 
committed was perjury, which was a misdemeanor.51 You cannot execute 
him for perjury, so what do you do with Oates? By the way, this is all 
public record; you can read the trial of Titus Oates.52 So, he gets convicted 
of two counts of perjury, and at sentencing, the judges say, “Well, Mr. 
Oates, this is a misdemeanor so we cannot take your life and we cannot take 
your limb, but we have something special prepared for you.”53 That is close 
to the actual language – “We have something special prepared for you.” 
Here is what they had prepared for him. 
 
They fined him two thousand marks, which was a very large fine.54 They 
had him flogged while being dragged across the city of London from 
Aldgate to Newgate, and then two days later, just as the wounds started 
healing, he was once again flogged while being dragged across the city of 
London from Newgate to Tyburn.55 Many people think the hope was that he 
would be flogged to death, but like a cockroach in a nuclear war, he 
survived.56 
 
He was also sentenced to pillorying four times a year for life.57 You are 
looking at an actual woodcarving of Oates in the pillory.58 They used to 
make these woodcarvings, and they would print postcards and sell them.59 
                                                          
47 Stinneford, supra note 8, at 1760. 
48 Id. 
49 See Leonard G. Johns, et al., Serial Murder: Multi-Disciplinary Perspectives for Investigators, 
Federal Bureau of Investigations (Robert J. Morton ed.), https://www.fbi.gov/stats-
services/publications/serial-murder#two. 
50 Id. 
51 Stinneford, supra note 8, at 1760. 
52 See, e.g., Second Trial of Titus Oates, 10 How. St. Tr. 1227, 1314 (K.B. 1685). 





58 See John Simkin, Titus Oates, Spartacus Educational, (Aug. 2014), https://spartacus-
educational.com/STUoates.htm. 
59 Id. 




Oates was also sentenced to life imprisonment and he was defrocked.60 That 
was the punishment inflicted on Titus Oates. Now, this all happened in 
1685, under Charles II.61 Charles II died a few years later.62 He was 
succeeded by his brother, James II, who was a Catholic.63 People did not 
like him very much, and they eventually ran him out of town. They invited 
William and Mary to come over and become the new king and queen of 
England.64 Parliament said to William and Mary, “We would like you to be 
our new sovereign, but before you come, we have come up with this thing 
called ‘the Bill of Rights.’ We would like you to sign it, and if you sign the 
Bill of Rights, we will make you king and queen.”65 Of course, William and 
Mary were already measuring the drapery at Windsor Palace, and so they 
were like, “Sure!” They signed it and it became law, and who showed up in 
Parliament the very next year but Titus Oates.66  
 
Again, you can read all of this. You can read the parliamentary debates 
about this.67 Oates showed up he said, “Hey, good job on that Bill of 
Rights. By the way, I noticed that it prohibits cruel and unusual 
punishments. It just so happens that the punishment inflicted on me was 
cruel and unusual. Will you please suspend the judgment?” There was a big 
debate about it in Parliament, and if you read the debates, it is very clear 
that a majority in Parliament believed that his punishment was cruel and 
unusual.68 In fact, members of the House of Commons said that they were 
thinking specifically of Oates when they wrote the cruel and unusual 
punishments clause that appeared in the English Bill of Rights initially.69 
Most importantly, they gave the reasons they believed Oates’s punishment 
was cruel and unusual: They said it was “contrary to law and ancient 
practice,” it was without precedent, and it would create a bad precedent for 
the future.70 It was unprecedented, contrary to ancient practice, and 
therefore cruel and unusual. 
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Parliament did not suspend the judgment against Oates because the House 
of Lords just hated him so much, they could not do it.71 There is an actual 
quote where they say “[s]o ill a man” should not get the benefit of the Bill 
of Rights.72 But even though Oates lost, the debate over Oate’s punishment 
shows what it means for a punishment to be cruel and unusual: It must be 
unjustly harsh in light of longstanding prior practice. By the way, Titus 
Oates’s case contradicts Justice Scalia's claim that a punishment has to 
involve an inherently cruel or barbaric method of punishment to be cruel 
and unusual. All of the punishments inflicted on Oates except defrocking 
were acceptable under the common law at the time.73 Even if you added 
them all up together, the absolute level of harshness was not as great as 
some punishments that were inflicted for other crimes at the time. For 
example, for treason you could get drawn and quartered, which is very, 
very gruesome and painful.74 Compared to drawing and quartering, Oates’s 
punishment could not be considered inherently cruel or barbaric. It is clear 
that if Oates’ punishment was cruel and unusual, it was because it was 
disproportionate to the crime of perjury. It was unprecedented as a 
punishment for this sort of offense. So, in England, clearly proportionality 
was part of the analysis. 
 
Now you might be thinking, “Well okay, that is fine, but that is England. 
Didn’t we have a revolution to get away from them? Why should we think 
that the cruel and unusual punishments clause in the Eighth Amendment 
means the same thing that it did in England?” In fact, there is a lot of 
evidence of this. I have written an article about it – if you have trouble 
sleeping, it is a great sleep aid.75 Both in the run up to the revolution and 
also during the debate over the Constitution, Americans regularly use the 
word “unusual” to mean contrary to the common law, unprecedented, or 
innovative.76 For example, the Virginia House of Burgesses sent a letter to 
the King of England complaining that British efforts to deny Americans the 
right to a jury trial were “unusual” – meaning new, unprecedented.77 
Similarly, in the debate over the Constitution, the framers associated 
innovation in punishment with the adoption of the civil law practices of 
Europe.78 They worried that if Congress was not bound to follow the 
common law, it might decide to follow the example of the Spanish 
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Inquisition and impose torture, which is prohibited by the common law. 
The cruel and unusual punishments clause was designed to prevent that 
from happening. Patrick Henry famously criticized the entire federal 
government as a series of “new and unusual experiments.”79  
 
It is quite clear historically that the Eighth Amendment was meant to serve 
as a check on Congress’s ability to deviate from the common law tradition. 
We do not want government innovating punishment in a way that is 
significantly harsher than prior punishment practice would permit. What 
does this mean? I told you Justice Scalia said we should look at a snapshot 
of 1790 to figure out whether a punishment is permissible. The evolving 
standards of decency test asks us to look at snapshot of current practice.80 
The actual original meaning asks us to look at longstanding prior practice – 
that is, it directs us to ask what the tradition has been up to today and how 
this new punishment we are trying to impose compares to the punishments 
that have traditionally been imposed for a given crime.  
 
What would the effect of adopting this standard be on current Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence, and in particular the death penalty? 
 
First of all, the original meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause precisely reverses the evolving standards of decency test. Instead of 
asking “Does this traditional punishment still meet our current standards of 
decency?” the courts should be asking, “Does this new punishment meet 
our traditional standards of decency?” That is the idea. Underlying this is 
the idea that we most need to worry about cruelty when there is some kind 
of public panic that has driven the government to feel that it needs to get 
tough on crime, to show that it is in control. That is when we are most 
likely to see cruel punishment and that is when we need courts to intervene 
to prevent it from happening. That is the basic idea behind the original 
meaning of the clause.81 
 
Second, this standard is distinct from Justice Scalia's standard, because the 
common law incorporates a doctrine called “desuetude,” which says that if 
a practice falls out of usage for a significant period of time, then it is 
considered to be no longer part of our tradition.82 The idea is it has not 
survived the test of time and therefore, if you introduce it now, it is just like 
introducing new punishment. The mere fact that we mutilated people in 
1790 does not mean we can do so today, and the mere fact that we executed 
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people for crimes like counterfeiting in 1790 does not mean we can do so 
today. These punishments fell out of usage long ago. They are no longer 
part of the tradition. If you bring them back, you should not compare them 
to the practices of 1790, but to the tradition as if it has survived up to today. 
 
Third, as I noted earlier, it is quite clear that the clause incorporates a 
proportionality principle. I did not talk much about the American side of 
that today, but I have written a whole article on the topic so if you are 
interested, you can read it.83 Disproportionate punishments are a form of 
cruel and unusual punishment.84 
 
Now, what does this say to us about the death penalty? It says several 
things, I think. First of all, to the extent the death penalty has survived 
continuously over time, it cannot plausibly be characterized as cruel and 
unusual. It is not new or innovative, and thus does not come within the 
prohibition of the Eighth Amendment. 
 
Several once-traditional applications of the death penalty may now be cruel 
and unusual, however. For example, it is probably unconstitutional to 
execute someone for counterfeiting, even though this punishment was 
inflicted for this crime in the 1790s, because this application of the death 
penalty did not survive the test of time. 
 
Also, many state constitutions have their own cruel and unusual 
punishments clauses.85 Usage is jurisdiction specific, so if a given 
jurisdiction eliminated the death penalty a long time ago, and then tried to 
bring it back, you might be able to say, “Well, this is cruel and unusual 
under the constitution of this state, because this is not a part of our state’s 
tradition – even though it may not be cruel and unusual as a federal matter.” 
This is one area where many state constitutions may be more protective 
than the federal constitution. 
 
The final point I want to make has to do with methods of punishment, using 
lethal injection as an example. Lethal injection is, in many ways, a window 
into American punishment practices generally. The public perception of 
lethal injection is that it is just like putting an animal to sleep: You give the 
offender an injection, they to go to sleep and never wake up. That is the 
public perception of lethal injection. But this is not how it actually works. 
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Lethal injection typically involves a three-drug cocktail.86 One of those 
drugs, until recently, has been a barbiturate. If you give someone a massive 
overdose of barbiturates, he will go to sleep and never wake up. That is how 
animals are euthanized. But lethal injection does not involve just 
barbiturates, it also involves a heart stopping agent and a paralyzing agent.87 
 
Let us talk for a minute about why lethal injection involves all three drugs. 
To get there, I think we need to talk a little bit about the history of the 
methods of execution in this country. Traditionally – if you look at the 
nineteenth century, for example – executions were often performed by 
methods such as hanging or the firing squad. These were methods that, if 
done properly, would kill someone quite quickly, and I believe relatively 
painlessly, but they were gruesome. They were public in the nineteenth 
century.88 Every now and then, there would be a botched execution and 
people watching the execution would be really angered and repulsed by 
what they saw. There are occasions in the nineteenth century where people 
would try to lynch the executioner when the executioner would botch an 
execution.89 So, how did the state respond to this? First, the state moved 
executions into the prison yard and then, finally, inside the prison.90 
 
Now, the reason that has been given publicly, and what you may have all 
been told, is that this was done to prevent the coarsening of public 
opinion.91 We do not want people to enjoy watching someone die. Maybe 
that is part of it, but I do not think it was the driving reason. I think the 
driving reason for making executions private was to eliminate public 
revulsion against executions. If you just read about an execution, you are 
not going to get especially upset. You are much less likely to be angry even 
to read about a botched execution. 
 
Then what did we do? We adopted different methods of execution, each of 
which was supposed to be more scientific and less cruel than the ones that 
came before.92 We went to electrocution when electricity was new.93 It was 
supposed to be painless, but it turns out that it was not. It was gruesome and 
often painful. There were also more botched electric chair executions than 
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there had been for hangings.94 Over time, it became clear that this was 
problematic, so we switched to the gas chamber.95 The gas chamber, too, 
was supposed to be painless, but actually often caused a gruesome death. It 
also took a long time – sometimes fifteen minutes or more – for a person to 
asphyxiate in a gas chamber.96 Then we finally came up, in the 1970s, with 
lethal injection.97 
 
Why the three-drug cocktail? The problem with barbiturates was that they 
took too long. It could take forty-five minutes or an hour for someone to 
die.98 The state thought, “We need to be able to speed up the process, we 
need it to happen fast.” So, the barbiturates were combined with a heart-
stopping agent, was supposed to kill the offender quickly.99 But there are 
two problems with the heart-stopping agent. One is that if you are not fully 
unconscious, it is an extraordinarily painful way to die. It is like being 
burned to death from the inside, like having battery acid poured into your 
veins. Now, barbiturates are supposed to take care of that. You are 
supposed to be asleep. But if you do not have enough barbiturates, or they 
are not properly administered, you are going to feel excruciating pain. The 
other problem with the heart-stopping agent is that it causes convulsions. 
Even if the offender is fully unconscious, he or she will flip around on the 
table and would appear to be in a lot of pain.100 The state did not want that. 
They wanted it to look like the offender is going to sleep. So, they also give 
the offender a paralyzing agent.101 The paralyzing agent makes sure you do 
not move at all. 
 
Now, there are two problems with a paralyzing agent. One of those 
problems is that if the barbiturates are not properly administered, then death 
by paralyzing agent is also extremely painful, because it is like being 
asphyxiated. Your lungs stop working, but your brain keeps working, so 
you feel as though you are drowning.102 Now imagine drowning and being 
burned to death from the inside at the same time. That is what it is like if 
you are not fully unconscious. The barbiturate is supposed to solve that 
problem, but of course there is the risk that it might not be properly 
administered. You might not be fully unconscious. Of course, because of 
the paralyzing agent, so if you are conscious and you are feeling every bit 
of it, we do not know because you have been paralyzed. You cannot 
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register any physical reaction to the pain you are experiencing. This is the 
problem now. 
 
Lethal injection is also an extraordinarily complex procedure. It involves 
three different drugs, and proper administration requires skill and expertise. 
Generally speaking, doctors do not want to be involved, so the procedure is 
performed by prison officials. The states also often compartmentalize the 
process so that there is nine or ten different people involved in different 
stages of the process so no one feels too responsible for the death. But there 
can be a mistake during any one of those stages, and the 
compartmentalization makes the mistake harder to discover.103And so, what 
you end up having is a great risk of a botched execution.  
 
There is a recent study showing that lethal injections are botched at more 
than twice the rate of hangings, for example – more than twice the rate.104 
This is just the botched executions that we know of. If lethal injection is 
botched, remember, the offender is tortured to death. This is what we are 
doing with respect to lethal injection.  
 
In short, lethal injection appears to meet the criteria for a cruel and unusual 
punishment under the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment.105 It is a 
new method of punishment and is significantly harsher than traditional 
methods like hanging. Now, you might ask yourself, “Why are we doing it 
this way? Why are we using a three-drug cocktail?” I think the answer is 
aesthetics. We are doing it so that we can feel better about ourselves as a 
society, and the state can minimize public reactions against the death 
penalty. If you can hide from public view the fact that you are violently 
killing someone – and that is what we do every time we execute someone – 
then the public will not react against the death penalty. Now, we have 
moved executions out of the public square, inside the prison yard, inside the 
prison, and even inside the prison where we are using drugs to hide the 
nature of what we do to make it look better – more antiseptic so that there is 
no public reaction against the death penalty.  
 
I think this is the big problem, because under the original meaning of the 
Eighth Amendment, the idea is that over the long term you can rely on 
public opinion to eliminate cruel methods of punishment. That is the 
supposition underlying the clause, but of course public opinion can only be 
relied upon to eliminate cruel punishments if the public knows what is 
happening. The public should have some basis of assessing whether 
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something is cruel and unusual or not. Currently, the public does not have 
that basis because the state does everything it can to hide executions from 
public view. 
 
This is my final point. In a way, lethal injection is a microcosm of the entire 
criminal punishment system in this country. Starting in the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, we moved from largely public punishments – think of 
Titus Oates in the pillory – to private punishments, where we take you and 
we put you in a prison cell. That seems nicer. Less degrading and less 
humiliating. But once you are inside the prison cell, we cannot see you. We 
cannot see the suffering that you are undergoing. So, the legislature says, 
“Hey, let's change the punishment for burglary from two years in jail to five 
years, to ten years, to twenty years.” The public can rarely see the increased 
harshness, the increased pain, increased suffering, and the increased cruelty 
of that punishment. I think that is one of the reasons that it was so easy over 
the last forty years to ratchet up the harshness of punishment, to the point 
where we now incarcerate more people than ever before, because the public 
just cannot see it. 
 
That is a significant problem. I do not know the solution to it. I think the 
work of the Innocence Project, and the work that Ms. Bishop is doing, has 
been extremely effective in reducing the death penalty, at least in some 
states. But I think if we want to be truly effective in showing the public 
what is cruel about our system and what needs to be changed, we need to 
find a way to let the public see it.  
 
Thank you very much.  
